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Abstract: Much attention has been paid to models of currency crisis with self-fulfilling 
features and the concept of multiple equilibria developed in the 1990s. They aim at explaining 
currency crisis without apparent fundamental disequilibrium. They are also useful to render 
account for currency crisis unpredictability. This paper re-examines an illustrative model of 
Obstfeld (1996), in which high unemployment may cause an exchange-rate crisis with self-
fulfilling features. By completing the algebraic demonstration, this paper shows that there are 
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There was a largely shared perception that neither in the Exchange Rate Mechanism 
(ERM) nor in Mexico, the currency crises were predictable based on criteria developed by the 
first generation of currency crisis models (Krugman 1979, and Flood and Garber 1984).  
To reflect this perception, models of currency crisis with self-fulfilling features were 
notably developed by Obstfeld (1994, 1996, 1997) and Sachs et al. (1996) among others. In 
these models, currency crises are often explained as a result of the incompatibility between 
accommodative domestic fiscal and monetary policy and fixed exchange rate under high 
degree of capital mobility. 
These models of the second generation are generally characterized by the existence of 
multiple equilibria, hence making market expectations determinant in instigating successful 
currency attacks without that the fundamentals are particularly deteriorated.
1 While not being 
able to explain the ulterior Asian currency and financial crises, they have popularised the 
concept of self-fulfilling multiple equilibria which is intellectually attractive for many 
researchers who work on currency crisis.  
The attractiveness of models of currency crisis with self-fulfilling features is that they 
allow establishing the similitude between a run on a bank and speculation against a currency. 
They both create objective economic conditions that make bankruptcy or liability devaluation 
more likely. As a result, even pegged exchange rates that could be sustained indefinitely in the 
absence of a speculative attack can succumb to adverse market sentiment.  
Some currency crisis models of the third generation are strongly influenced by these 
models of currency crisis with self-fulfilling features and have also generated multiple 
                                                 
1 See Masson (2001) for a survey.    3
equilibria thanks to intuitive approach or static treatment of dynamic model (see, e.g., 
Krugman 1999, and Aghion et al. 2000).
2  
However, the multiple equilibrium solutions are not robust to the introduction of small 
degree of uncertainty in the information about fundamentals (Morris and Shin, 1998)
3 or 
opacity about the central bank’s preferences (Dai, 2009a).  
Without introducing new assumptions, the present paper will show that the existence of 
three equilibria conjectured by Obstfeld (1996) is not robust to rigorous algebraic 
demonstration.  
The model of Obstfeld aims at giving an example where the underlying macroeconomic 
‘fundamentals’ are far from irrelevant to the outcome of speculative attack, since they can 
determine the range of possible equilibria. The existence of multiple equilibria provides an 
economic foundation for the coordination game of currency-market traders who do not 
neglect the fact that the changing macroeconomic fundamentals alter the degree of discomfort 
a government will suffer because of an attack. 
Notably, Obstfeld wants to show that only extreme values of fundamentals are either 
consistent with long-run fixity of the exchange rate or are not. There is also a large middle 
ground over which fundamentals are neither so strong as to make a successful attack 
impossible, nor so weak as to make it inevitable. In this case speculators may or may not 
coordinate on an attack equilibrium. Unfortunately, the solution of the model is not 
completely carried out by Obstfeld and the results are based on conjecture and rhetoric rather 
than on sound economic analysis. 
                                                 
2 Even if the model of Krugman (1999) allows grabbing quite easily the causes of 1997’s Asian currency and 
financial crises, his intuitive and static approach of a dynamic model with balance-sheet effect has yielded a 
misleading result, i.e. there are three equilibria with the lowest equilibrium corresponding to zero investment. As 
it is shown by Dai (2009b), there is not always a lowest equilibrium with zero investment. 
3  See Allegret and Cornand (2006) for a survey of the literature about the pros and cons of information 
transparency on the exchange rate market and their effect on the occurrence of speculative attacks. 
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I will show in the following that there is not such middle ground, using exactly the same 
model and same assumptions. I will demonstrate that there are only two equilibria instead of 
three. One of these two equilibria is the equilibrium under free float and the other could be a 
devaluation or a revaluation equilibrium according to the values of parameters characterising 
the economy, the preference of the government as well as the costs attached to devaluation or 
revaluation. 
In the next section, I present the model used by Obstfeld as well as his algebraic and 
graphic solutions. In section 3, by completing the algebraic demonstration, I prove that the 
intermediate equilibrium does not exist. I conclude in the final section. 
 
2. The model and the multiple equilibria solution of Obstfeld 
 
The fully-articulated model of currency crisis analysed by Obstfeld (1996) is based on 
Obstfeld (1994, 1997), in which the government’s objectives are explicitly spelled out. In this 
model, Obstfeld has shown that there are three equilibria which can be ranked by the degree 
of market scepticism in the current exchange rate, and the consequent worsening of 
employment conditional on the current parity’s maintenance. Collapse may be a sure thing, 
but it needs not be: different equilibria entail different probabilities of collapse. The model’s 
basic framework is drawn from Barro and Gordon (1983), but assumes an open economy and 
identifies the price of foreign currency with the domestic price level. 
The government minimizes the loss function: 
) ( ) (
2 2 * ε βε C y y L + + − = ,         ( 1 )  
where y is output, y* the government’s output target,  1 − − = e e ε  the change in the exchange 
rate (e, the price of foreign currency expressed in terms of domestic currency),  ) (ε C  a cost 
function which is zero when the fix parity is maintained and positive (negative) if the national   5
currency is devaluated (revaluated). Variables represented by lower-case Roman letters are 
expressed in terms of natural logarithms. Output is determined by the expectations-augmented 
Phillips curve: 
u y y
e + − + = ) ( ε ε α ,        ( 2 )  
where  y  is the ‘natural’ output level, 
e ε  is domestic price-setters’ expectation of ε  based on 
lagged information, and u  is an i.i.d. mean-zero shock. The assumption  y y >
*  causes a 
dynamic inconsistency problem which, aside from being needed for multiple equilibria, 
provides a reason why a rational government might try to tie its hands by submitting to 
exchange-rate realignment costs. The expected variation of the exchange rate 
e ε  is taken to 
be time-invariant, which is the case in equilibrium given the model’s assumptions. 
The government chooses the exchange rate e  after observing u  (unlike private price-
setters), but any upward change in the rate (devaluation) leads to  c C = ) (ε  in (1), whereas 
downward changes (revaluation) cost the government  c C = ) (ε .
4 
A government which abandons the fixed exchange rate regime will face two kinds of loss, 
the loss due to variations of output and inflation around of their respective target under the 
flexible exchange rate regime and the credibility cost due to the abandon of the fixed 
exchange rate regime. Consider first the loss due to variations of output and inflation under 
flexible exchange rate regime, so that we can ignore the term  ) (ε C  in (1). The government 
minimises the loss function (1) with  ) (ε C  being set at zero subject to the constraint given by 
equation (2). Taking 
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achieving an output level of 
                                                 
4 The fixed cost of a parity change could be a political cost due to reneging on a promise to fix the exchange rate 
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If the government chooses to maintain the fixed exchange rate, the loss instead is: 
2 * ) (
e FIX u y y L αε + + − = . 
Since the government is initially engaged in a peg, it faces two policy options: 1) To stay 
in the peg; 2) To abandon the peg by adopting the flexible exchange rate after a devaluation or 
revaluation. In the presence of fixed costs  ) (ε C  linked to the abandon of the peg, the 
government chooses option 2 only when u is so high that 
FIX FLEX L c L < +  or so low that 
FIX FLEX L c L < + . Devaluation thus occurs for  u u > , and revaluation for   u u < , where  
e y y c u αε β α
α
− + − + =
* 2 ) (
1
, 
e y y c u αε β α
α
− + − + − =
* 2 ) (
1
.  
Departing from the exchange rate peg, the rational expectations of next period’s ε  given 
e ε  will depend on the probabilities of devaluation and revaluation. Obstfeld considers that u 
is uniformly distributed on [ μ μ, − ]. Then, the rational expectation of next period’s ε , given 
price setters’ expectation 
e ε , is  
) Pr( ) ( ) Pr( ) ( ) ( u u u u E u u u u E E > > + < < = ε ε ε .  
Using the property of the uniform law of probability distribution yields: 
μ 2
1 ) Pr( ) Pr(
u u
u u u u
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= > ,   (probability  of  having  u u > ). 
Using these properties and equation (3), we obtain the expectations of speculators ( ) (ε E ) 
under the exchange rate peg as function of price setters’ expectations as follows: 
) Pr( ) ( ) Pr( ) ( ) ( u u u u E u u u u E E > > + < < = ε ε ε         
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u u e .                                 (4) 
Under the floating exchange rate, using equation (3), the rational expectation of next 
period’s ε  by the speculators, given price setters’ expectations 







2 * ) (
) (
e y y
E .           ( 5 )  
In full equilibrium, 
e E ε ε = ) ( . To find out the fix points of equation (4), Obstfeld graphs it   
together with a 45° line and conjectures that there ‘may’ be three equilibria after some 
discussions about the derivatives of u , u  and  ) (ε E  with respect to 
e ε .  
Obstfeld makes then the following analysis. Once 
e ε  has risen high enough that u  is 
stuck at  μ − , the government’s reaction function is simply (3) and depreciation expectations 
are the same as under a freely flexible exchange rate. Fig. 1 shows how there can be three 
equilibrium expected depreciation rates,  1 ε ,  2 ε  and  3 ε , corresponding to three different 
devaluation probabilities and realignment magnitudes conditional on devaluation.    8
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Fig. 1. There may be three equilibrium expected depreciation rates, 
the highest of which is same as under a free float.
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ε  as the freely flexible exchange-rate equilibrium. Fig. 1 shows that this last 
equilibrium has to exist, even when  0 > c , if there are to be multiplicities at all. By using the 
definition of u  and equation (5) and assuming that  μ − < u , it is easy to show that the formal 











+ ≥ − −
+
c y y .       (6) 
which is more likely to hold if the devaluation cost c  is low, the slope α  of the Phillips curve 
is high, inflation aversion ß is low, and the credibility distortion  y y −
*  is big. Condition (6) 
means that if market operators expect the floating exchange-rate average depreciation rate, it 
will materialize the fixed cost of devaluation notwithstanding. 
                                                 
5 Fig. 1. corresponds to Fig. 3 in Obstfeld (1996).   9
The government is powerless to enforce its preferred equilibrium should market 
expectations coordinate around an inferior one. Then Obstfeld deduces that some seemingly 
minor random event (a sunspot) could shift the exchange rate from a position where it is only 
vulnerable to very bad u  realizations to one where output is so low in the absence of 
devaluation that even moderate shocks will induce the authorities to realign. The government 
could also be forced into an immediate effective float.  
The strength of ‘fundamentals’, as reflected in the government’s tastes and the economy’s 
structure, affects the multiplicity of equilibria. A fall in the natural output level y shifts the 
vertical intercept of Eq. (4) upward. Thus, as  y  falls from 
* y , the corresponding expectations 
schedule shifts from a single low-inflation intersection with the 45° line, to three, and back to 
a unique equilibrium in which devaluation is a probability 1 event. 
One minor problem with the above discussion due to Obstfeld is that condition (6) is 
obtained under the condition  μ − < u . Since he initially assumes that u  is uniformly 
distributed on [ μ μ, − ], condition (6) cannot be true since this assumption implies that 
] , [ μ μ − ∈ u .  
In the following, I will focus on a much serious error arises in Obstfeld’s intuitive 
conjecture based on equation (4).  After having intuitively discussed why the conjecture made 
by Obstfeld is unfounded, I will formally demonstrate it.  
 
3. Existence of two fix-points instead of three 
 
In the absence of credibility costs associated with revaluation or devaluation, the threshold 
under which a revaluation is possible is the same threshold over which a devaluation is 
possible, i.e. u =u .    10
Since the central bank is assumed to have an output objective which is higher than the 
natural level, u  and u  are drawn to the left. Consequently, in the absence of credibility costs, 
the probability of expected devaluation is superior to that of expected revaluation under the 
law of uniform distribution. 
  
         μ −                           u =u          0                                             μ  
Fig. 2. Threshold of devaluation and revaluation. 
The introduction of credibility costs increases the threshold above which a devaluation is 
possible, but reduces the threshold under which a revaluation is possible.  
 
                    μ −                  u                        0                    u                        μ  
        Fig. 3. The effect of credibility costs on the thresholds of devaluation or revaluation. 
 
Since the cost of devaluation is higher than that of revaluation, u  moves more to the right 
than  u  moves to the left. Therefore, the expected value of a revaluation for  u u <  may 
dominate or not the expected value of devaluation for  u u > .  
The above discussion shows that ( u u − ) is independent of 
e ε  and hence  ) (
2 2 u u −  is a 
linear function of 
e ε . Consequently, there are no reason for  ) (ε E , determined by equation 
(4), to increase exponentially as shown in Fig. 1.  
In effect, Obstfeld has not exploited the algebraic implications of equation (4). Instead, he 
conjectures that “there may be three equilibrium expected depreciation rates, the highest of 
which is same as under a free float”. That is also the title of his Fig. 3. Unfortunately, this 
conjecture is wrong. We can check it easily by substituting the definition of u  and u  into 
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The equilibrium solution of  ) (ε E , i.e. the fix-point where 
e E ε ε = ) ( , can be obtained by 
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y y E
e .      (9) 
The second solution is the flexible exchange rate, given by equation (5). If the government 
decides to devaluate, it is this equilibrium that will be finally attained after some adjustment 
of the speculators’ expectations.  
The intermediate equilibrium disappears since the relationship between  ) (ε E  and 
e ε  
represented by equation (4) is linear.  
Two cases are distinguished in the following.  
Case 1. According to equation (8), for  0 ≤
e ε , the equilibrium value of  ) (ε E  would be 








) )( ( + −
< −
c c
y y .        ( 1 0 )  
In the Fig. 4, an equilibrium with revaluation ( 1 ε ) and an equilibrium with devaluation 
( 2 ε ) are represented. The public believes in a revaluation, even if the government has 
incentive to devaluate in the event of large inflation shock. 
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Fig. 4. Two equilibra: coexistence of beliefs of devaluation and revaluation. 
 
Case 2. Equation (8) implies that, for  0 ≥
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Equation (4) could imply the existence of two equilibria of devaluation (Fig. 5).  
                              ) (ε E  
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       Fig. 5. Two equilibria of devaluation. 




By reconsidering a well-known example of model with self-fulfilling features studied by 
Obstfeld (1996), I have shown that the solution of three devaluation equilibria that he has 
conjectured is not robust to rigorous algebraic demonstration.  By completing the algebraic 
demonstration without introducing new assumptions, I have found that there are only two 
equilibria. One is a devaluation equilibrium corresponding to the free float and another could 
be a revaluation or devaluation equilibrium.  
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